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in healthcare without due regard to these disruptions risk alienating key stakeholders. We propose a more 
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around rights and responsibilities appropriate to the intentions of those involved in healthcare 
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National electronic health records and the digital disruption of moral orders 
 




The digitalisation of patient health data to provide national electronic health record systems 
(NEHRS) is a major objective of many governments. Proponents claim that NEHRS will streamline 
care, reduce mistakes and cut costs. However, building these systems has proved highly problematic. 
Using recent developments in Australia as an example, we argue that a hitherto unexamined source 
of difficulty concerns the way NEHRS disrupt the moral orders governing the production, ownership, 
use of and responsibility for health records. Policies that pursue digitalisation as a self-evident 
‘solution’ to problems in healthcare without due regard to these disruptions risk alienating key 
stakeholders. We propose a more emergent approach to the development and implementation of 
NEHRS that supports moral re-ordering around rights and responsibilities appropriate to the 
intentions of those involved in healthcare relationships. 
 
Keywords: Australia; National electronic health record systems; Moral order; Digital disruption; 




Many governments are investing in nation-wide information systems that will collate individual 
health records and make them available across organisational and geographic boundaries (Brennan, 
2007; Morrison, Robertson, Cresswell, Crowe, & Sheikh, 2011; Stroetmann et al., 2011). These 
systems, which for the purposes of this paper we call NEHRS (National Electronic Health Record 
System/s) are often integral components of broader attempts to reform healthcare. Policymakers, 
politicians and some researchers claim that digitising health information will help eliminate 
inefficient paper-based systems and cut costs, while facilitating the development of new, better 
coordinated models of ‘paperless’ care (Christensen, Grossman, & Hwang, 2009; Hunt, 2013). 
Making electronic records available to citizens, proponents claim, will also encourage them to take 
more responsibility for their own health (Ball, Smith, & Bakalar, 2007; National Health and Hospitals 
Reform Commission, 2009a). 
 
However, existing research suggests that although these visions are compelling, translating them 
into workable systems is highly problematic (Deutsch, Duftschmid, & Dorda, 2010; Greenhalgh, 
Russell, Ashcroft, & Parsons, 2011). As well as the technical challenges of replacing or connecting 
diverse legacy systems, new forms of governance are needed to manage the potential risks 
associated with the wider distribution of potentially sensitive information. In many nations, including 
England, Australia and the Netherlands, attempts to formulate new rules at a national level around 
patient consent, privacy, data quality and access in relation to NEHRS became mired in controversy. 
In England a ‘big opt out’ campaign forced changes to policy and contributed to significant delays in 
the roll out of a national ‘summary care record’ (Carvel, 2006; Cross, 2008). The Dutch Senate 
abandoned plans for a NEHRS in 2012 amid concerns about privacy (Smits, 2013). Australia's NEHRS 
has also encountered opposition from privacy groups and doctors who are concerned about its 
security, safety and utility (Coiera, Kidd, & Haikerwal, 2012; Dearne, 2012a). 
 
In this article we argue that one reason NEHRS have been so difficult to implement is that 
policymakers have seriously underestimated the degree to which digitalisation disrupts existing 
social, moral and medico-legal orders through which healthcare is governed and delivered. Too 
often, these disturbances are pushed into the background while the technical capabilities of NEHRS 
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are foregrounded as ‘the solution’ to the challenges facing healthcare systems. Centralised 
authorities attempt to resolve the resulting disruptions by trying to impose new rules that seemingly 
fail to satisfy interested parties. We suggest that a more holistic, flexible and emergent approach 
that prioritises and supports the intentions of those involved in care relationships may help address 
some of the difficulties encountered by nations attempting to introduce NEHRS. Governments need 
to demonstrate more commitment to providing adequate opportunities for those engaged in 
healthcare to explore anticipated and unexpected shifts in their identities, practices and 
relationships, and to consider modes of governance that support the intentions of those involved in 
care as it evolves in the digital age. 
 
Our argument is structured as follows. In the next section we develop the idea of healthcare as a 
cluster of intersecting and negotiated moral orders that, while stable enough to facilitate care most 
of the time, are also subject to change and disruption. These orders emerge out of and shape 
interactions across many sites, from private, situated healthcare encounters to public debates about 
national health policy. Our focus in this article is on the latter, as it is in the policy arena that 
governments have tried, without much success so far, to manage the disruptions generated by the 
introduction of NEHRS. We place these debates within a broader context of shifting power 
relationships among doctors, patients and the state, and outline the pivotal role that medical 
records play in mediating these relationships. Debates surrounding the introduction of a NEHRS in 
Australia are then presented to illustrate how the innovation disrupted established patterns of 
formalised rights and responsibilities. While these disruptions open up possibilities for more 
connected, person-centred care, they also create ambiguities that may hinder implementation if, as 
occurred in Australia, parties who perceive the innovation as threatening attempt to fortify their 
positions within pre-existing orders. We conclude by considering approaches that may facilitate a 
more productive way of reaping the potential benefits of NEHRS while working through the 
governance challenges they pose. 
 
The multiple negotiated orders of healthcare 
 
The idea that healthcare is delivered through a series of negotiated orders grew out of ethnographic 
observations of work in hospitals in the 1960s. Strauss, Schatzman, Ehrlich, Bucher, and Sabshin 
(1963), Strauss, Fagerhaugh, Suczek, and Wiener (1985) observed how the work of caring for 
patients was not determined by rules or procedures, but achieved through ongoing actions and 
interactions carried out in response to contingencies as well as formal and informal rules and 
expectations. Negotiated orders are not just evident within single organisations, however. They also 
emerge out of and shape relationships among organisations and entities in their environment, such 
as client groups and government agencies (Strauss, 1982). Following this line of analysis, we can 
view healthcare as occurring within arenas populated by different social worlds – lay people, medical 
professionals, policymakers and bureaucrats – who collectively negotiate the formal and informal 
‘rules’ that shape the delivery of care (Clarke, 2005). 
 
An important aspect of these negotiations concerns the moral orders of healthcare, that is, systems 
of ‘rights, obligations and duties’ that mediate relationships among actors in the arena (Langenhove 
& Harré, 1994). Moral orders are multi-layered and often contested. They can be found at different 
levels of generality – from the policies and regulations that allocate rights and responsibilities to 
institutions, to the implicit ‘rules’ that shape interactions in single healthcare encounters (Harré, 
Moghaddam, Cairnie, Rothbart, & Sabat, 2009; Thévenot, 2001). Moral orders are also integral to 
the discursive production of identities, as individuals and institutions position themselves and others 
in relation to these orders. Positions, in this view, are ‘clusters’ of rights and responsibilities that 
‘belong’ to individuals as members of collectives, or that individuals claim and contest as they create 
themselves and their institutions as competent, moral entities. Positions are adopted, negotiated 
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and challenged with regard to people's capacities, training, vulnerabilities and social and institutional 
locations (Harré et al., 2009; Langenhove & Harré, 1994). Thus, in most developed nations, people 
position themselves as having ‘rights’ to healthcare based on their vulnerability to sickness or 
disability, and see its provision as a state ‘responsibility’. There are many, often contestable, moral 
orders within this broad pattern, especially around controversial issues such as vaccination, 
contraception, end-of-life care and abortion (Blume, 2006; Simonds & Ellertson, 2004). 
 
Since the middle of last century, doctors have wielded considerable power in healthcare arenas. 
Based on their training and expertise, they have claimed and exercised rights to control the content 
and conditions of their work. As Hughes noted, these rights are linked to doctors' assumption of 
major responsibilities for healthcare outcomes. In common with other occupations in which 
mistakes can be fatal, they ‘build up collective defenses against the lay world’ (Hughes, 1971: 318). 
They claim rights to police the boundaries of their profession – who is allowed in, processes for 
managing accidents and mistakes, the circumstances in which colleagues are called to account, and 
the criteria according to which they are judged competent or otherwise (Hughes, 1971; Willis, 1983). 
As we discuss below, medical records are crucial for policing and legitimating medical work. 
 
In recent decades, rising costs and expectations of improvements in the quality of care and health 
outcomes, have prompted policymakers to negotiate new orders that erode some of these rights. 
Providers are now often obliged to follow standardised evidence-based protocols with payments 
linked to compliance (Bury & Taylor, 2008; Christensen et al., 2009). Policymakers are also 
attempting to reduce costs by ‘empowering’ people to take more responsibility for their own health. 
Proponents of NEHRS claim that the technology has the potential to facilitate this empowerment by 
providing citizens with access to their own records and electronic connections to multiple carers 
when illnesses are chronic and complex (Christensen et al., 2009). However, merely implementing 
NEHRS without paying attention to and managing disruptions to entrenched distributions of rights 
and responsibilities can lead to frustration and waste (Westbrook & Braithwaite, 2010). The benefits 
of NEHRS, we suggest, are unlikely to be realised until we understand their implications, not only for 
models of care, but also for the moral orders that govern medical practice and the interactions we 
all have with our healthcare systems. 
 
Records in the moral orders of healthcare 
 
The medical (or health) record is a ‘mundane yet surprisingly multi-layered technology’ (Berg & 
Harterink, 2004: 15) that has evolved as healthcare practices have changed. Initially records were 
‘owned’ by practitioners, as they chronicled symptoms and illness trajectories for teaching and 
research (Reiser, 1991a). These often idiosyncratic accounts helped develop the expert knowledge 
that legitimates doctors' rights to practice. From the 19th century onwards such narratives were 
supplemented by more organised records designed to facilitate additional modes of ordering linked 
to new positions within the healthcare arena. With the introduction of managers in hospitals, 
separate records were used for billing and administration (Siegler, 2010). 
 
As the influence of scientific management spread, initially in the United States then elsewhere, 
attempts were made to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of hospitals through more reliable, 
standardised record keeping (Reiser, 1991b; Berg & Harterink, 2004). Reformers in the early 20th 
century proposed using records to ‘fix responsibility’ for adverse outcomes (Reiser 1991b: 908). A 
new position of ‘medical record librarian’ emerged with rights to rationalise medical note-keeping 
into prescribed formats. These changes were initially resisted by doctors who viewed them as 
encroachments on their rights to practice as they saw fit. However, more extensive and standardised 
record -keeping was also in their professional interests as it facilitated research and helped police 
standards of competent practice that enhanced public trust and prestige. By the 1930s hospital 
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records in the US were considered reliable enough to be admitted as evidence in court cases. This 
intersection of legal and healthcare arenas created new medico-legal responsibilities, rights and 
risks, and further incentives for comprehensiveness and standardisation (Berg & Harterink, 2004; 
Berg & Winthereik, 2004). Similar trends have been evident in primary care where records have also 
become increasingly standardised (Purves, 2002). 
 
The moral orders of medical record keeping have also been shaped by the changing position of 
patients, now recast as active participants or ‘consumers’ of healthcare (Harris, Wathen, & Wyatt, 
2010). Until the 1960s it was common, at least in the US, for doctors to withhold diagnoses from 
patients thereby robbing them of the capacity to contribute to decisions about their care (Laine & 
Davidoff, 1996). This situation has changed, and most patients now expect to be informed about 
diagnoses and options for treatments available to them. While some, especially those with serious 
and/or chronic conditions, still prefer doctors to make decisions about care (Sinding et al., 2010) 
there is a broad consensus that patients should have access to their records (Ross & Lin, 2003). 
 
Given the multiple purposes of medical records and the diversity of actual and potential audiences, 
it is not surprising that tensions surrounding their production and use endure. Siegler (2010) noted 
that complaints about the ‘variable quality’ of records go back ‘almost a century’, along with 
attempts to improve them. Since the 1960s, reformers have looked to computers to ‘modernise’ 
record keeping, but it is increasingly clear that merely digitising data does not address the challenges 
involved in accommodating diverse work routines and expectations. Nor does it necessarily satisfy 
the different audiences that may be interested in the information, especially when systems span 
organisational boundaries (Greenhalgh et al., 2011; Hackl, Hoerbst, & Ammenwerth, 2011; Jenkings 
& Wilson, 2007). 
 
Some of the enduring tensions surrounding medical records can be traced to competing moral 
priorities in contemporary societies (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006). Boltanski and Thevenot identified 
six ‘orders of worth’ that shape the way people develop and justify claims about how things should 
be. The drive towards standardised, complete and accessible records prioritises efficiency, which 
sometimes clashes with more traditional medical values of trust and individualised care. Decades 
ago, Garfinkel et al. documented tensions between different moral priorities in medical record -
keeping. While administrators in their research setting valued efficiency and ‘actuarial’ record 
keeping that privileged ‘completeness, clarity, credibility and the like’ (Garfinkel & Bittner, 1967: 
190), healthcare providers at the frontline of delivery were more interested in recording just enough 
detail to indicate that they had satisfied their contractual or moral obligations to patients in their 
care (Garfinkel & Bittner, 1967). 
 
Many advocates of NEHRS value the technology's potential to provide doctors with ‘all of the 
information about all of their patients all of the time’ (Rauber, 2008). This actuarial view 
homogenises data into a single desirable commodity – the more the better – with the integration of 
this information as ‘the solution’ to problems in healthcare. By focussing on data availability rather 
than the moral and contractual aspects of care, these advocates underestimate the extent to which 
the rights and responsibilities attending the collection and exchange of health information are 
intimately bound up with the intentions of those delivering care in particular contexts (McLoughlin & 
Wilson, 2013). As NEHRS are designed and implemented, these issues come to the fore in contests 
over governance. Below, we illustrate how these contests emerged during the implementation of a 
NEHRS in Australia. 
 
The troubled history of Australia's NEHRS 
 




This article is based on a retrospective study of the development of NEHRS in Australia. We collected 
relevant documents and organised them for analysis using ‘Zotero’ software. A chronology of 
significant events was constructed, and key stakeholder bodies and opinion leaders identified. We 
selected 106 documents in which they presented and argued their positions and/or responded to 
the positions constructed for them by others. Significant players in Australia's NEHRS policy arena 
were clustered as follows: the Federal Government and its advisory bodies (National Health and 
Hospital Reform Commission, Department of Health and Ageing, Health Ministers, National e-Health 
Transition Authority, Senate Committee for Community Affairs), consumer groups (Consumers' 
Health Forum, Consumers e-Health Alliance), health informatics groups (Australasian College of 
Health Informatics, the Medical Software Industry Association), privacy advocates (Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner, Australian Privacy Foundation) and peak professional bodies 
representing doctors (Australian Medical Association, Royal Australian College of General 
Practitioners). Statements relating to risks, problems, capacities, vulnerabilities, rights and 
responsibilities surrounding key elements of the moral orders governing health records, for example, 
consent and access rules, responsibility for data quality, liability for negligence, mistakes and 
accidents were identified and collated in a table (142 pages) that summarised the positions of 
participants in the arena, and their responses to positions constructed for them by others. The table 
was read through multiple times to identify key points of tension. Developing interpretations were 
circulated and discussed among the research team to produce the account below. 
 
Moral ordering in Australia's healthcare policy arena 
 
Australia has a complex healthcare system, with responsibilities for policies, funding and delivery 
shared among state, territory and federal governments (Willis, Reynolds, & Keleher, 2008). While 
distributions of rights and responsibilities around information systems in single organisations or 
across regions can be locally negotiated, designing and implementing NEHRS requires national 
legislation, resourcing and coordination (Coiera, 2009). 
 
Health ministers have considerable rights and responsibilities for setting policy agendas. However, 
they typically act selectively on recommendations put forward by taskforces and commissions 
convened to research and suggest ‘solutions’ to perceived problems. Draft policies are usually 
released for discussion and submissions invited from interested parties before legislation to 
implement plans is introduced into parliament. Healthcare policies often seek to redistribute rights, 
responsibilities and resources among providers, citizens and governments. The drafting and 
submission stage provides opportunities for participants in the healthcare arena to respond to the 
positions created for them by policymakers and others exercising influence in the arena. This activity 
occurs in what Thévenot (2001) calls a ‘public regime of justification’ – a mode of engagement in 
which actors debate and set general conditions such as rules and standards that shape interactions 
across multiple microsocial situations. This engagement is a ‘high level’ mode of moral ordering, and 
participants are expected to legitimate their claims with reference to the common good. However, 
this ‘global’ ordering can disrupt local routines and relationships. For workable sociotechnical 
infrastructures to emerge from this activity, plans and systems need to be flexible enough for 
tensions between local and high level orders to be addressed (Star & Ruhleder, 1996). 
 
The following account reveals the tensions that emerged in the public regime of justification in the 
lead up to the implementation of a NEHRS in Australia in 2012. Despite the tension, policymakers 
and others persisted with a belief in the capacity of digital technology to provide the core of a 
‘solution’ to problems plaguing healthcare. As has been the experience in other jurisdictions 
(Brennan, 2007; Hackl et al., 2011) this has resulted in a system that many claim is far from optimal 




Policymakers' proposals: a ‘person-controlled’ EHR 
Health ministers in Australia have been interested in NEHRS since the early 1990s (Clarke, 1992). 
However, efforts to build such systems have had to contend with the legacy of the ‘Australia Card’ 
controversy of the 1980s, when citizens concerned about privacy blocked plans to introduce a 
compulsory national identity card (Clarke, 1988). An attempt to build a NEHRS during the 2000s 
collapsed, as the complexities of the proposal came to be realised (Dearne, 2005, 2009; Deloitte, 
2008; Fujitsu Consulting, 2004). In 2005 the government established a National e-Health Transition 
Authority (nehta.gov.au) to work on technical components, but concerted attempts to design and 
implement a new system did not achieve momentum until 2009, when a commission convened to 
help reform healthcare in Australia recommended the introduction of a ‘person-controlled’ 
electronic health record – hereafter called the PCEHR (National Health and Hospitals Reform 
Commission, 2009a,b). 
 
According to the reform commission, the PCEHR would have multiple benefits: 
 
The introduction of a person-controlled electronic health record for each Australian is one of 
the most important systemic opportunities to improve the quality and safety of health care, 
reduce waste and inefficiency, and improve continuity and health outcomes for patients. 
Giving people better access to their own health information through a person-controlled 
electronic health record is also essential to promoting consumer participation, and 
supporting self-management and informed decision-making (National Health and Hospitals 
Reform Commission, 2009a: 8). 
 
The federal health minister endorsed these proposals and set a starting date for the PCEHR of 1 July 
2012. 
 
Throughout the development of the PCEHR spokespeople from the government and its advisory 
bodies have highlighted ‘person-control’ as a significant feature of the design of NEHRS in Australia. 
The reform commission made an emphatic distinction between earlier plans for NEHRS that were 
‘controlled by the health provider (or held centrally) and shared with other approved providers but 
with limited or no access by the patient’ and the proposed PCEHR which, by contrast, would be 
‘controlled by the patient and shared with nominated health care providers’ (National Health and 
Hospitals Reform Commission, 2009b: 11–12). This represents a significant shift in the moral orders 
that have customarily governed the use of information in the healthcare sector. While patients' 
rights have been expanding for decades, the suggestion that they control their EHR has far reaching 
implications for the rights and responsibilities of healthcare providers, patients and state. 
 
The PCEHR creates new positions for citizens with attendant discursively constructed (and 
contested) rights and responsibilities. The reform commission positioned ‘persons’ as ‘gatekeepers 
of their own health record’ (National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission, 2009b: 8). Design 
principles devised by government agencies outlined the following rights for citizens: deciding 
whether to have a PCEHR and if so what information is included; access to the record and a capacity 
to set controls determining which healthcare providers and other people (carers, family members) 
can see it; and access to audit trails to see who has accessed their PCEHR and what they have done 
with it (Department of Health and Ageing, 2011). The government portal enabling registration 
informs citizens that: 
 
You will control what goes into your eHealth record, and who is allowed to access it. Over 
time an eHealth record will help put you at the centre of your own healthcare (Department 




With these rights come new responsibilities: 
It will be imperative that consumers are made aware that with the right to control access to 
their health record comes a responsibility that incomplete information on their P[C]EHR may 
harm their health care. Consumers need to develop an understanding that incomplete 
records could pose a danger to their contacts, their carers, and the public if not made 
available to their clinical care team (National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission, 
2009b: 13–14) 
 
The moral orders of healthcare are relational. That is, shifts in the position of patients engender 
changes in the positions of implicated others, most notably the doctors who hold major 
responsibilities for ensuring that competent care is delivered. 
 
The re-positioning of doctors and doctors' responses 
 
Before technologies such as the PCEHR became possible, doctors were in control of, and responsible 
for, the medical records of patients in their care. The ‘use and disclosure’ of that information ‘within 
the reasonable expectations of the patient at the time of collection’ did not need their explicit 
consent, and patients' access to their records was at the provider's discretion. Doctors were advised 
that if records were made available ‘it is normally desirable for the medical practitioner to be 
present to clarify any aspects and to permit any concerns of the patient to be discussed and 
resolved’ (Royal Australian College of General Practitioners, 2002). 
 
The PCEHR disrupts these established arrangements by creating an information repository that still 
requires doctors to be involved, but with ambiguous responsibilities and uncertain control. 
Advocates of the technology position providers as ‘beneficiaries’ of the PCEHR on the grounds that it 
will enable them to ‘access health information more efficiently’ and ‘deliver more effective 
healthcare’ (Department of Health and Ageing, 2011: 15). The peak professional bodies for doctors – 
the Australian Medical Association (AMA) and the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners 
(RACGP) – have made statements supporting e-health (e.g. Australian Medical Association, 2011; 
Royal Australian College of General Practitioners, 2011a) but they have also contested the positions 
created for them by the PCEHR, on the grounds that it imposes additional unclear responsibilities on 
them with, they claim, marginal benefits and unknown medico-legal risks. Participation by providers 
is voluntary, but the government has the right to withhold payment of certain ‘incentives’ unless 
they take part (Ramli, 2012). 
 
Although the PCEHR is ostensibly owned and controlled by lay people, its creation requires a 
‘nominated provider’: ‘an identified healthcare provider involved in the ongoing care of the 
individual who has agreed with the individual to create and manage their Shared Health Summary’ 
(Department of Health and Ageing, 2011: 50). The shared health summary initially includes allergies 
and adverse reactions, medicines, medical history and immunisations. The PCEHR will also contain 
‘event summaries’ and clinical documents, such as discharge summaries, specialist letters and 
pathology results, submitted by any ‘participating provider’ with the consent of the patient. People 
cannot restrict access to their shared health summary but they can limit what is included and who 
sees the additional documents. They can also remove documents if they choose to do so 
(Department of Health and Ageing, 2011). 
 
Doctors claim that explaining the PCEHR to patients, negotiating what is included, outlining the risks 
of ‘hiding’ data and maintaining records imposes additional work, risks and responsibilities for which 
they should be compensated (Dearne, 2012b). After resisting, the government agreed to remunerate 
doctors for longer consultations involving the PCEHR (Royal Australian College of General 
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Practitioners, 2012). There was also concern about ‘the expectation that medical practitioners will 
trawl through swathes of information each time they access a PCEHR’ (Australian Medical 
Association, 2011: 4). Doctors' obligations to view information in the PCEHR are unclear. The AMA 
has tried to limit implied responsibility in this area. Its guidelines for doctors state, ‘There is no 
obligation for you to review any or all of the information in a patient's PCEHR’ (Australian Medical 
Association, 2012: 16). 
 
The AMA and RACGP are also concerned about what they see as risks associated with ‘person-
control’. They lobbied successfully to remove a capacity for people to set ‘no access’ controls that 
would hold even in emergencies (O'Brien, 2011). More pervasive than this concern however, are 
what they fear are uncertain medico-legal risks associated with the availability of records whose 
degree of (in)completeness and up-to-dateness is unknown to doctors and out of their control. The 
reform commission that initially proposed the PCEHR anticipated these concerns, noting that it is 
‘only one piece of the puzzle’, not ‘a reliable record in itself’ (National Health and Hospitals Reform 
Commission, 2009b: 13). The National e-Health Transition Authority also presented the risks as no 
different to the current situation, in which ‘consumers … exercise choice in the information they 
provide to different healthcare providers’ (National e-Health Transition Authority, 2012: 4). The 
PCEHR is not meant to be a replacement for doctors' records. Providers need to keep their own 
records in parallel, and communicate with others using their customary methods (Australian Medical 
Association, 2012). 
 
The PCEHR is some way, it seems, from providing a ‘data rich environment …that connects all 
participants with relevant, accurate and secure information in real-time’ that reformers promised 
(National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission, 2009a: 127). Instead, the Australian Medical 
Association (2011: 3, 9) claims the environment will be ‘clinically equivalent’ to the present, with a 
‘negligible’ capacity to reduce mistakes and prevent duplication. Moreover, government assurances 
that the risks and responsibilities are no different to pre-PCEHR days have not, it appears, placated 
the medical profession. Responsibilities for keeping the PCEHR as up-to-date and complete as 
possible are unclear. According to the PCEHR design principles, nominated providers are ‘required to 
assert that they have assessed and described all aspects of the Shared Health Summary and taken 
reasonable steps to verify the accuracy of information’ (Department of Health and Ageing, 2011: 51). 
No further statements regarding provider responsibilities for data quality are included in the design 
principles, beyond an assurance that, ‘nominated providers are not expected to update a Shared 
Health Summary outside of a consultation with an individual’ (Department of Health and Ageing, 
2011: 51). Doctors' bodies give ambiguous advice. The RACGP states that, ‘the onus will be on the 
general practitioner to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the PCEHR content’ (Royal 
Australian College of General Practitioners, 2011a: 3). The Australian Medical Association's (2012: 
17) guidelines on the other hand assert, ‘There is no additional responsibility for Nominated 
Healthcare Providers to curate, monitor or review any other information on their patients’ PCEHRs, 
outside of creating or reviewing a Shared Health Summary for the patient'. 
 
Doctors position themselves as ‘burdened’ rather than assisted by the system (Royal Australian 
College of General Practitioners 2011b; Australian Medical Association, 2011). The AMA guidelines 
advise doctors to be defensive, recording details of discussions they have with patients regarding the 
PCEHR, and all interactions they have with it. In other words, they are advised to recontextualise the 
information obtained from the record, incorporating it into their own separate records of their 
contractual obligations to patients, should they ever be subjected to scrutiny. As the Australian 
Medical Association (2012: 22) warns, ‘the medico-legal risks [of the PCEHR] for medical 
practitioners and medical practices are unknown until case law develops’. The AMA is responding to 
what it sees as uncertainties in the distribution of rights and responsibilities around the PCEHR by 




Having said this, doctors' bodies are not entirely opposed to a NEHRS. The RACGP is supportive 
provided the ‘potential risks’ are clarified and resolved (Royal Australian College of General 
Practitioners, 2011a). The Australian Medical Association (2011: 2) sees much promise in a, ‘simple, 
trustworthy and secure electronic health record that integrates easily with current workflow 
practices’. The current PCEHR in its view has ‘unacceptable complexities’ due to the 
‘disproportionate emphasis given to the concerns of an extreme minority who wish to mask details 
of their health record’ (Australian Medical Association, 2011: 2). According to AMA President 
Hambleton, ‘the consumer groups have maintained control over the records to the detriment of all 
consumers’ (quoted in Gliddon, 2011). 
 
Consumer groups and concerns about privacy 
 
Consumer and privacy advocates welcome the emphasis on personal control and argue that it 
should be extended. Spokespeople for consumers resent them being positioned as incompetent, 
dependent and/or obstructive with regard to the PCEHR. In response to AMA comments that an 
‘unrepresentative few’ have hijacked the technology, the CEO of the Consumers' Health Forum 
retorted: ‘Consumers won't engage if there is an attitude that comes from the dark ages that doctor 
knows best … Consumers have got to be in the driving seat or they won't adopt it’ (quoted in 
Dunlevy, 2010). Similarly, the Consumers' e-Health Alliance (2011: 15) claims that ‘Some consumers 
are better able to manage their medical information than their healthcare providers’. According to 
Consumers' Health Forum research, consumers want to be more actively engaged: 
 
…consumers … overwhelmingly argued that ‘personal control’ means more to them than 
simply having access to their record and setting access controls. Consumers have told [the 
Consumers' Health Forum] that they want to be able to actively participate in the 
management of their record, particularly through entering data and accessing information in 
a way that is convenient to them (Consumers' Health Forum, 2011: 4 emphasis in original). 
 
The Office of the Information Commissioner also argued that consumers should have more control. 
It recommended extending the ‘limited access’ provision to the shared health summary, with 
consumers choosing which fields are included. It also recommended that consumers be able to set 
different levels of access for carers or family members allowed to see their records (Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner, 2011). These calls for more nuanced controls would have 
added extra complexity to an already complex system, and the recommendations were not taken 
up. Instead, personal control was reduced, as the ‘no access’ option was removed, and doctors 
gained a right to view ‘limited access’ documents during emergencies 
(O'Brien, 2011). 
 
Update and discussion 
 
The story of the PCEHR in Australia is far from complete. Debates in the public regime of justification 
leading up to its introduction, outlined above, focused on disruptions to customary rights around the 
ownership of and access to electronic health data, as well as responsibilities for their completeness 
and quality. Calls by politicians and others to delay implementation so that more time could be 
spent exploring and addressing these disruptions were not heeded (Dearne, 2012c). Instead, 
registration opened as planned on 1 July 2012, even though software for loading data into the 
system would not be ready for several months (Connors, 2012). Registration was initially slow but 
escalated after a publicity campaign in 2013 (McDonald, 2013) and the deployment of ‘sign-up 
squads’ to hospitals and aged care facilities, a move which provoked some criticism (Dunlevy, 2013). 
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By the end of July 2013, 2.7% of a population of around 22 million had registered for a PCEHR, and 
4,585 shared health summaries had been uploaded (National e-Health Transition Authority, 2013). 
 
Possibilities for the PCEHR to reshape moral orders at the front line of healthcare delivery, that is, in 
situated encounters between patients and their providers, are only just being opened up as we 
write. How these possibilities play out will be the subject of future research. Existing ethnographic 
studies of the changes wrought by smaller electronic health record systems suggest that their use 
provokes subtle and unexpected changes in identities, relationships and work routines (Jensen, 
2010; Vikkelsø, 2010). These changes are more complex than simply introducing ‘better’, more 
‘ordered’ ways to organise work. Instead, they enable new practices to emerge that redistribute 
what counts as ‘order’ and ‘disorder’ (Berg & Timmermans, 2000). As outlined above, there are 
already multiple orders in play among those who produce, use and regulate medical record keeping. 
The PCEHR cannot and will not resolve tensions among them by turning the perceived ‘disorders’ of 
a fragmented system into a new order of seamless integrated care. Instead, as a parallel system with 
ambiguous rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis the information it contains, it adds additional 
complexity. Only time will tell whether it will be another expensive failure or if it evolves into a 
technology that citizens and healthcare providers find useful. Prospects for the latter will be 
enhanced by opportunities for interested parties to work with and around the ambiguities opened 
up by the PCEHR. This requires more sophisticated processes of technology design and 
implementation than those pursued in Australia in recent years. Below we offer some suggestions 
for alternative ways to conceptualise and introduce complex healthcare technologies such as NEHRS 
that may help to accommodate and manage the multiple moral orders surrounding digital records. 
 
Discussion: digital disruption, intentions and the ‘meta’ moral ordering of NEHRS 
 
The difficulties that policymakers in many nations have experienced in their attempts to introduce 
NEHRS can be traced to a ‘dangerous enthusiasm’ for technology-driven fixes to complex social 
problems (Gauld & Goldfinch, 2006). In their enthusiasm for NEHRS as a ‘solution’ to rising 
healthcare costs and increasing demand, policymakers focus on a version of digitalisation that 
assumes its worth is self-evident to both consumers and providers. The moral complexities 
surrounding the digital collection and sharing of health data – manifested for example in concerns 
over privacy and confidentiality – are treated as secondary problems that can be tidied up through 
the post hoc development of new procedures governing consent and access. As the experience in 
Australia illustrates, however, in practice these complexities are not so easily managed. 
 
Instead of placing faith in technology, we suggest that policymakers need to recognise and 
understand the intentions of the multiple stakeholders involved in arenas such as healthcare before 
digitalisation is attempted. What we have in mind here is the facilitation of what might be termed a 
‘second order’ or ‘meta’ mode of moral ordering whose purpose is to nurture collective and dynamic 
re-ordering among actors in a conscious attempt to identify, work through and rethink the rights and 
responsibilities that are appropriate for supporting the intentions of those who produce and use 
information to deliver care. This would involve much more than simple truncated ‘consultations’ 
around details of a pre-specified design, such as those that occurred in Australia in the lead up to the 
PCEHR. In the latter case, the ‘consultations’ inhibited exploration of the system's utility in the eyes 
of providers and consumers and instead fed concerns over privacy and governance. 
 
Meta-ordering, on the other hand, would involve sustained interaction around ‘boundary objects’ 
such as prototypes and pilot trials, to allow the possibilities opened up by digitalisation to be 
explored alongside their implications for established patterns of rights and responsibilities. Such 
multi-stakeholder engagement in dialogues that attempt to build consensus would inevitably be 
time-consuming, difficult and messy, but may ultimately be more productive than rushed 
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implementations that fail to engage potential users. It would not require a ‘God's eye view’ or a pre-
ordained endpoint towards which action is orchestrated, but rather a collective, facilitated journey 
that explores how things might be ordered differently. There are examples of such interactive re-
orderings around shared electronic health record systems in Australia and England, albeit in more 
localised contexts, that have generated productive results (see e.g. Garrety, Dalley, McLoughlin, 
Wilson, & Yu, 2012; Jenkings & Wilson, 2007; McLoughlin & Wilson, 2013). 
 
Scaling such examples up to a national or whole system level clearly presents major challenges, as 
heavy up front investments in the infrastructure required to support systems of innovation are 
needed. As a report for one UK innovation ‘think tank’ recently argued, getting returns on such 
investments requires considerable parallel resources for building alliances and developing a common 
purpose around a recognition of what is of value in order to change behaviour (Leadebeater, 2013). 
 
As this article is being completed, the new Coalition Federal Government in Australia has announced 
a review of the future of the PCEHR (Foo, 2013b). Whether this review provides a catalyst for actors 
in the arena to seek a common understanding by working through their currently divergent 
intentions remains to be seen. Our fear is that left to its own devices the debate will once again be 
reduced to another round of polarising discourse. To get beyond this, we should neither simply put 
our faith in what are assumed to be the self-evident benefits and utility of the digitalisation of health 
data; nor should we just resist the technology because of fears concerning threats to privacy and 
confidentiality. To make some progress we need to develop the basis for a better kind of 
conversation about electronic health records than this. 
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